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OFF-COURT MISBEHAVIOR: SPORTS
LEAGUES AND PRIVATE PUNISHMENT
JANINE YOUNG KIM* & MATTHEW J. PARLOW**
This Essay examines how professional sports leagues address
(apparently increasing) criminal activity by players off of the field or court.
It analyzes the power of professional sports leagues and, in particular, the
commissioners of those leagues, to discipline wayward athletes. Such
discipline is often met with great controversy—from players’ unions and
commentators alike—especially when a commissioner invokes the “in the
best interest of the sport” clause of the professional sports league’s
constitution and bylaws. The Essay then contextualizes such league
discipline in criminal punishment theory—juxtaposing punishment norms in
public law with incentives and rationales for discipline in professional
sports—and analyzes the legal and cultural limitations to this approach.
I. INTRODUCTION
Hardly a day goes by without news of misbehavior by a professional
athlete. In the month of February 2009, for example, the media reported
such misbehavior on at least twenty-two out of twenty-eight days.1 Often,
such misconduct involves criminal behavior by an athlete that occurs off the
athletic field or court.2 Some have suggested that professional athletes are
particularly prone to criminal behavior.3 Others have countered that this is
*
Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Yale Law School;
M.A., B.A., Stanford University.
**
Associate Professor of Law, Marquette University Law School; J.D., Yale Law
School; B.A., Loyola Marymount University. The authors wish to thank Professors Paul
Anderson, Matt Mitten, and Michael O’Hear for their comments on an earlier draft of this
Essay, and Stephen Howitz, Michael Miner, Katie Tornberg, and Ashley Wilson for their
research assistance. We would also like to thank Marquette University Law School for its
financial support.
1
Copies of these news stories are on file with the authors.
2
Of the twenty-two stories, twenty-one involved arguably criminal behavior, with only
one article involving non-criminal behavior.
3
See, e.g., Joel Michael Ugolini, Even a Violent Game Has Its Limits: A Look at the
NFL’s Responsibility for the Behavior of Its Players, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 41, 44-45 (2007)
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merely a perception created by greater media scrutiny of professional
athletes.4
Whether such criminality is perceived or real, sports leagues have
begun to take a firmer stand on disciplining athletes for their transgressions.
Commissioners of these leagues are imposing harsher and more frequent
penalties when athletes commit criminal acts.5 This trend raises interesting
questions regarding the authority of professional sports leagues to punish
athletes for such misbehavior. Leagues’ exercise of punitive authority over
public, criminal acts by individuals also calls for a theoretical analysis that
explores the relationship between private and public criminal law in the
sports law context.
Part II of this Essay begins this analysis by describing the power of
professional sports leagues, and, in particular, the commissioners of those
leagues, to discipline their athletes for criminal acts committed off the court
or field. In addition, this Part analyzes courts’ and arbitrators’ treatment of
these private acts of punishment. Part III explores the reasons why
professional sports leagues discipline their athletes for such misbehavior.
Part IV traces the rise of private punishment, as distinct from public law
punishment. Part V grapples with the question of whether a professional
sports league’s discipline of its athletes for off-the-court or off-the-field
criminal acts should be construed as public or private punishment,
especially in light of the reasons discussed in Part III. Finally, this Essay
concludes by reflecting on the significance of this recent development in
sports and criminal law.

(casting doubt on a study demonstrating that professional football players are less criminal
than other males of the same age and race).
4
See, e.g., Laurie Nicole Robinson, Comment, Professional Athletes Held to a Higher
Standard and Above the Law: A Comment on High-Profile Criminal Defendants and the
Need for States to Establish High-Profile Courts, 73 IND. L.J. 1313, 1327 (1998); see also
Jared Chamberlain et al., Celebrities in the Courtroom: Legal Responses, Psychological
Theory and Empirical Research, 8 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 551, 565 (2006) (“Research has
found that athletes are stereotyped by the public as violent, drug abusing, and lacking
intelligence.”). One scholar explores journalists’ motivations for covering such stories and
what that trend says about popular culture, sports, and news reporting. See Robinson, supra,
at 1324 (recalling a time when the media protected professional athletes as one where
athletes and reporters made similar salaries and were both predominantly white). See
generally David Ray Papke, Athletes in Trouble with the Law: Journalistic Accounts for the
Resentful Fan, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 449 (2001).
5
In fact, commissioners of professional sports leagues are beginning to punish athletes
for behavior off of the court or field that may not be criminal in nature, but which may bring
disrepute and embarrassment to the league. See infra Part III. While these instances pose an
interesting tension in the context of private punishment, they are outside the scope of this
Essay.
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II. AUTHORITY AND PROCEDURE
A. SOURCES OF POWER

The power of professional sports leagues to discipline athletes for
criminal activity off the court or field is relatively clear and settled, yet
highly controversial. Across the four main professional sports leagues,6
“commissioners and/or presidents of the various professional sports leagues
notoriously possess dominant powers in governing league matters.”7 In
these sports leagues, the commissioners’ powers derive, in part, from league
constitutions and bylaws.8 These general powers include the authority to
punish athletes for criminal acts committed outside the scope of play. In
particular, constitutions, bylaws, and collective bargaining agreements of
the major sports leagues contain provisions granting commissioners the
authority to discipline players for acts deemed not in the “best interest” of
the sport.9
The “best interest” clause developed in Major League Baseball (MLB)
in response to the Chicago Black Sox scandal during the 1919 World
Series, where gamblers bribed players to throw the coveted baseball
championship.10 After the scandal, MLB consolidated power in a newly
created Commissioner11 and appointed Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis as
6

The four main professional sports leagues are widely understood to be Major League
Baseball (MLB), the National Basketball Association (NBA), the National Hockey League
(NHL), and the National Football League (NFL).
7
RAY YASSER ET AL., SPORTS LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 379 (2006).
8
Id. at 380.
9
See MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. II, § 2 (authorizing the MLB Commissioner to
discipline athletes who act in a manner “not in the best interests of . . . baseball”); NAT’L
BASKETBALL ASS’N CONST. & BYLAWS art. XXXV(d) (granting the NBA Commissioner the
power to discipline “any Player who, in [the Commissioner’s] opinion, shall have been
guilty of conduct prejudicial . . . or detrimental to the [NBA]”); NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE
CONST. & BYLAWS § 17.3(a) (granting the NHL Commissioner the authority to discipline an
athlete whose conduct, “whether during or outside the playing season has been dishonorable,
prejudicial to or against the welfare of the League or the game of Hockey”); NAT’L
FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. & BYLAWS art. VIII; NFL MGMT. COUNCIL & NFL PLAYERS
ASS’N, NFL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 2006-2012 app. C, ¶ 15 (2006) (enabling
the NFL Commissioner to discipline an athlete who acts in a manner that is “detrimental to
the League or professional football”); see also MATTHEW J. MITTEN ET AL., SPORTS LAW AND
REGULATION 436 (2005) (noting the best interest of the sport power); Jason M. Pollack, Note,
Take My Arbitrator, Please: Commissioner “Best Interests” Disciplinary Authority in
Professional Sports, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 1645 (1999) (discussing the best interest power in
different professional sports leagues).
10
Robert I. Lockwood, Note, The Best Interests of the League: Referee Betting Scandal
Brings Commissioner Authority and Collective Bargaining Back to the Forefront in the
NBA, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 137, 141-44 (2008).
11
Id. at 141.
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its first Commissioner.12 Among the powers of the new Commissioner was
the authority “to impose punishment and pursue legal remedies for any
conduct . . . that [the Commissioner] determined to be detrimental to the
best interests of the game . . . .”13 The MLB Commissioner’s broad
authority was reinforced in Milwaukee American Ass’n v. Landis,14 where
the court acknowledged that “the commissioner is given almost unlimited
discretion in the determination of whether or not a certain state of facts
creates a situation detrimental to the national game of baseball.”15
Other professional sports leagues later adopted similar provisions in
their respective constitutions and bylaws. The commissioner’s power under
such a clause varies a bit from league to league, but it is similar in nature,
particularly in how it generally grants indeterminate discretion to the
commissioner in considering and meting out such discipline.16 This
seemingly boundless discretion, which is further discussed below with
regard to arbitration and judicial review, has been the source of much
controversy and criticism.17 It is worth noting that the scope of the
commissioner’s best interest powers may be limited by the particular
league’s collective bargaining agreement.18
Two additional sources provide commissioners with the power to
discipline athletes for misbehavior19: individual player contracts and the
12
J.C.H. Jones & Kenneth G. Stewart, Hit Somebody: Hockey Violence, Economics, the
Law, and the Twist and McSorley Decisions, 12 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 165, 194 (2002).
13
Matthew B. Pachman, Note, Limits on the Discretionary Powers of Professional
Sports Commissioners: A Historical and Legal Analysis of Issues Raised by the Pete Rose
Controversy, 76 VA. L. REV. 1409, 1415 (1990). Interestingly, Judge Landis would only
accept the newly created position if the MLB Commissioner had such broad authority and
power. See Shayna M. Sigman, The Jurisprudence of Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis, 15
MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 277, 301 (2005).
14
49 F.2d 298 (N.D. Ill. 1931).
15
Id. at 303.
16
See Kimberly M. Trebon, Note, There Is No “I” in Team: The Commission of Group
Sexual Assault by Collegiate and Professional Athletes, 4 J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
65, 91-93 (2007). But see Pachman, supra note 13, at 1415.
17
See Brent D. Showalter, Technical Foul: David Stern’s Excessive Use of Rule-Making
Authority, 18 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 205 (2007); Michael A. Mahone, Jr., Note, Sentencing
Guidelines for the Court of Public Opinion: An Analysis of the National Football League’s
Revised Personal Conduct Policy, 11 VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 181 (2008); Adam B. Marks,
Note, Personnel Foul on the National Football League Players Association: How Union
Executive Director Gene Upshaw Failed the Union’s Members by Not Fighting the
Enactment of the Personal Conduct Policy, 40 CONN. L. REV. 1581 (2008).
18
See Lockwood, supra note 10, at 154 (noting that the 1995 NBA collective bargaining
agreement limited the commissioner’s power to discipline as compared to the previous
collective bargaining agreement).
19
These sources of commissioner power are noteworthy because they derive from
collective bargaining between the leagues and their respective players’ unions. See Matthew
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collective bargaining agreements of each league.20 For example, the
standard NBA player’s contract contains a “good moral character” clause.21
This clause allows a team to terminate a player’s contract if the player’s
conduct and actions do not comport with standards of good morals and
citizenship.22 However, the NBA Commissioner has also used this clause
to impose punishment for player transgressions.23 In addition, through
collective bargaining, some professional sports leagues have adopted more
specific provisions covering their commissioners’ authority to discipline
players for acts committed outside the course of play. While MLB and the
NBA have not adopted such policies, the NFL and NHL have done so.24
In 2007, the NFL implemented its new Personal Conduct Policy (NFL
PCP).25 The NFL PCP requires that “[a]ll persons associated with the

J. Mitten & Timothy Davis, Athlete Eligibility Requirements and Legal Protection of Sports
Participation Opportunities, 8 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 71, 103-04 (2008). In this regard, as
noted above, the scope of the commissioner’s authority to discipline stemming from these
documents is agreed upon by both management and labor (that is, by the league and the
players’ union).
20
See Pachman, supra note 13, at 1418-19. Some professional sports leagues also have
policies related to drug use—both performance-enhancing substances, like steroids, and
recreational drugs, such as cocaine—that impose mandatory punishment on the athlete that
has violated the policy. The reasons for these policies and the controversies surrounding
them have been extensively written about elsewhere. See Mark M. Rabuano, Note, An
Examination of Drug-Testing as a Mandatory Subject of Collective Bargaining in Major
League Baseball, 4 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 439 (2002); Brent D. Showalter, Comment,
Steroid Testing Policies in Professional Sports: Regulated by Congress or the Responsibility
of the Leagues, 17 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 651 (2007); David M. Wachutka, Note, Collective
Bargaining Agreements in Professional Sports: The Proper Forum for Establishing
Performance-Enhancing Drug Testing Policies, 8 PEPP. DISP. RESOL. L.J. 147 (2007). As
these topics relate only tangentially to the topic of this Essay, we have excluded them from
our analysis.
21
See Carrie A. Moser, Penalties, Fouls, and Errors: Professional Athletes and Violence
Against Women, 11 SPORTS LAW. J. 69, 75 (2004).
22
See Sean Bukowski, Note, Flag on the Play: 25 to Life for the Offense of Murder, 3
VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 106, 110 (2001) (explaining that a former NBA team, the Golden
State Nuggets, was able to void the contract of one of its players after he choked the team’s
coach).
23
See Trebon, supra note 16, at 92.
24
See Robert Ambrose, Note, The NFL Makes It Rain: Through Strict Enforcement of Its
Policy, the NFL Protects Its Integrity, Wealth, and Popularity, 34 WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
1069, 1094-1100 (2008) (comparing and contrasting the disciplinary powers of the four
major sports leagues).
25
See NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, PERSONAL CONDUCT POLICY (2007), available at
http://www.nflplayers.com/images/fck/NFL Personal Conduct Policy 2008.pdf; Mahone,
supra note 17, at 181. The NFL Personal Conduct Policy (NFL PCP) replaced the NFL’s
Violent Crime Policy, which granted the commissioner the authority to discipline players
charged with any crime of violence. See Ambrose, supra note 24, at 1086-87. Interestingly,
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NFL,” including the players, “avoid ‘conduct detrimental to the integrity of
and public confidence in the National Football League.’”26 An athlete can
be punished for such detrimental conduct, even if his actions do not result
in a criminal conviction.27 This approach is in stark contrast to the NFL’s
previous conduct policy, which required the NFL Commissioner to
withhold punishment of an athlete unless there was a conviction or some
form of plea by the athlete.28
With the new NFL PCP in place, the Commissioner may discipline the
athlete at any time—once the league has conducted an investigation—so
long as he satisfies a proportionality requirement: “The specifics of the
disciplinary response will be based on the nature of the incident, the actual
or threatened risk to the participant and others, any prior or additional
misconduct (whether or not criminal charges were filed), and other relevant
factors.”29 Such discipline may include probation, fines, suspension, or
even banishment from the league.30 In addition, the Commissioner may,
separate and apart from any punishment he imposes, require the
misbehaving athlete to participate in counseling and other education
programs.31 However, the athlete does have the right to appeal any
discipline imposed by the Commissioner through Article XI of the
collective bargaining agreement and the NFL Constitution and Bylaws.32
The NHL has also adopted a similar type of policy in its Behavioral
Health Program (BHP).33 This policy allows the NHL Commissioner to
require a player to attend counseling sessions if he has a history of criminal
behavior.34 Interestingly, the Commissioner not only has sole discretion in
the NFL PCP was not collectively bargained, though it appears that the NFL Players
Association did acquiesce to the policy. See Marks, supra note 17, at 1584-85.
26
NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 25, at 1. Such detrimental behavior includes
domestic violence, theft, sex offenses, disorderly conduct, fraud, possessing a weapon in any
workplace setting, criminal offenses related to steroids and other prohibited substances,
dangerous actions that put the safety of another person(s) at risk, and “conduct that
undermines or puts at risk the integrity and reputation of the NFL.” Id. at 1-2.
27
Id. at 1 (“Persons who fail to live up to this standard of conduct are guilty of conduct
detrimental [to the league] and subject to discipline, even where the conduct itself does not
result in conviction of a crime.”).
28
See Mahone, supra note 17, at 185.
29
NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 25, at 2.
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 3.
33
See Trebon, supra note 16, at 91.
34
See The Clean Sports Act of 2005 and the Professional Sports Integrity and
Accountability Act: Hearing on S. 1114 and S. 1334 Before the S. Comm. on Commerce,
Science, and Transp., 109th Cong. 47 (2005) (statement of Ted Saskin, Executive Director,
National Hockey League Players Association).
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deciding whether to require such counseling, but his decision is not
reviewable by an arbitrator, as is the case with other NHL disciplinary
decisions.35 The BHP has four stages. In the first stage, the player attends
counseling, but is not subject to any other penalty.36 In the second stage,
the player continues treatment, but the NHL can suspend the player without
pay.37 In the third stage, the NHL automatically suspends the player for six
months.38 In the final stage, the NHL suspends the player without pay for
one year with no guarantee of reinstatement.39
Once an athlete is disciplined in one of the main professional sports
leagues, the athlete can appeal the decision—depending on the league—to a
neutral arbitrator, to the commissioner, or to the judicial system after these
administrative appeals have been exhausted.40 However, as the next section
suggests, the commissioners’ authority in disciplinary matters has been, and
in many ways continues to be, plenary in nature.41
B. JUDICIAL AND ARBITRATOR REVIEW OF COMMISSIONER-IMPOSED
PUNISHMENT

Not many cases challenging commissioners’ authority have made their
way to the courts, but those that have suggest significant judicial deference
to commissioner determinations. For example, in Molinas v. NBA,42 the
court upheld NBA President Maurice Podoloff’s indefinite suspension of
Jack Molinas for gambling on the Fort Wayne Pistons, the team that drafted
him.43 Molinas sued to be reinstated to the NBA, but the court found for
Podoloff, reasoning that eliminating gambling from the NBA was important
enough to justify the punishment.44 While the NBA did not have a best
interests clause at that time, the court’s reasoning in the case demonstrates a
deference to the NBA President’s determinations—at least so far as
gambling is concerned.

35

Id.
See NHL Round-Up, LCS: GUIDE TO HOCKEY, http://www.lcshockey.com/issues/54/
news.asp (last visited May 15, 2009).
37
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See Pollack, supra note 9, at 1648-49 (noting the differences in the professional sports
leagues in terms of players’ ability to appeal to a neutral arbitrator).
41
See Wm. David Cornwell, Sr., The Imperial Commissioner Mountain Landis and His
Progeny: The Evolving Power of Commissioners over Players, 40 NEW ENG. L. REV. 769,
772 (2006).
42
190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
43
Id. at 241.
44
Id. at 244.
36
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While seminal cases do not involve challenges to commissioners’
imposition of disciplinary measures, they are indicative of how courts might
treat such actions. For example, in Charles O. Finley & Co. v. Kuhn,45 the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals upheld MLB Commissioner Bowie
Kuhn’s denial of Oakland Athletics owner Charles Finley’s attempt to sell
the contracts of many of his marquee players in light of their impending
free agency.46 Finley had attempted to trade players such as Vida Blue,
Rollie Fingers, and Joe Rudi—those that the team would not be able to
afford when they became free agents—to other teams in order to use the
added resources to invest in the team’s farm system.47 Commissioner Kuhn
blocked this move, explaining that it ran contrary to the best interests of
baseball, the integrity of the game, and the public confidence in it.48 The
Seventh Circuit held in favor of Commissioner Kuhn, citing the best
interests clause.49
In Atlanta National League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn,50 the court
upheld Commissioner Kuhn’s year-long suspension of Atlanta Braves
owner Ted Turner for tampering with the San Francisco Giants’ exclusive
bargaining rights with outfielder Gary Matthews.51 The court again pointed
to the nearly unbridled authority of the MLB Commissioner: “[We have] no
hesitation in saying that the defendant Commissioner had ample authority
to punish plaintiffs in this case, for acts considered not in the best interests
of baseball.”52 However, the court did note that the Commissioner’s
discretion to impose punitive sanctions against an owner who violated MLB
rules and directives was limited to the enumerated list of punishments in the
Major League Agreement.53 Despite this limitation, the case was seen as
yet another victory for broad commissioner authority and power.
Commissioners have not fared quite so well, however, with
arbitrators.54 The highly publicized case of Steve Howe is a good example.
In 1991, after six previous recreational drug violations, Howe entered an
Alford plea—pleading guilty without actually admitting guilt—on charges
45

569 F.2d 527 (7th Cir. 1978).
Id. at 530-31.
47
Id. at 531.
48
Id.
49
Id. at 539.
50
432 F. Supp. 1213 (N.D. Ga. 1977).
51
Id. at 1217.
52
Id. at 1220.
53
Id. at 1225.
54
The players’ right to arbitral review arises out of the respective league’s collective
bargaining agreement. See, e.g., Joseph A. Kohm, Jr., Baseball’s Antitrust Exemption: It’s
Going, Going . . . Gone!, 20 NOVA L. REV. 1231, 1244 (1996) (noting that MLB players’
right to arbitration was gained through the collective bargaining agreement).
46
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of attempting to purchase cocaine and possession of cocaine.55 In response,
Commissioner Vincent suspended Howe for life.56 Howe, through the
Major League Baseball Players Association, filed a grievance before
MLB’s arbitrator challenging the lifetime ban.57 The arbitrator determined
that Commissioner Vincent’s lifetime suspension of Howe was “without
just cause”58 and amended Howe’s punishment to a year-long suspension
and a stringent drug-testing and drug-education program.59 The arbitrator
noted that while the Commissioner had a “reasonable range of discretion”
in addressing such drug violations, the punishment was not commensurate
with Howe’s transgressions, particularly in light of Howe’s psychiatric
illness.60 The arbitrator reached this decision despite recognizing the
importance of eradicating drug use in MLB.61 While this decision gives far
less deference to the Commissioner’s actions, it is because drug-related
offenses were then—as they continue to be for the most part now—
governed by different disciplinary standards and punishment than other
misbehavior committed by players.62
The case of former NBA star Latrell Sprewell provides another
example of how arbitrators are less willing to give commissioners the same
degree of deference as the judiciary. While playing for the Golden State
Warriors, Sprewell attacked and choked his coach, P.J. Carlesimo, during
practice on December 1, 1997.63 In response, NBA Commissioner David
Stern suspended Sprewell for one year.64 Sprewell, through the National
Basketball Players Association, appealed the decision to an arbitrator. The

55
Pollack, supra note 9, at 1692-93. From 1982-1988, Howe was suspended six times
for recreational drug violations. Id. at 1692. In 1988, upon Howe’s sixth offense,
Commissioner Kuhn gave Howe a lifetime suspension. Id. A couple of years later,
Commissioner Fay Vincent—who succeeded Commissioner Kuhn—reinstated Howe under
certain stringent conditions centering around a drug aftercare program. Id.
56
Id. at 1693; Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Comm’r of Major League
Baseball (Steve Howe Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2000, at 579, 582 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course
Handbook Series No. G-591, 2000) [hereinafter Steve Howe Arbitration Decision].
57
Steve Howe Arbitration Decision, supra note 56.
58
Id. at 583.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 598-603.
61
Id. at 618.
62
At that time, the MLB collective bargaining agreement allowed the arbitrator to
overturn the Commissioner’s punishment if the arbitrator found that there was no “just
cause” for the punishment. See Pollack, supra note 9, at 1693.
63
Nat’l Basketball Players Ass’n ex rel. Sprewell v. Warriors Basketball Club, in
UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE SPORTS INDUSTRY 2000, supra note
56, at 469, 481.
64
Id. at 482.
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arbitrator reduced the one-year suspension to the remainder of the 1997-98
NBA season.65 In justifying the reduction, the arbitrator explained that the
reduced punishment was more commensurate with the seriousness of
Sprewell’s actions.66 The arbitrator also reinforced the notion that the
Commissioner’s punishment should be fair in light of the circumstances.67
In this regard, though the reduction was not as drastic as the Howe case—
nor was it a significantly fewer number of games—the change in discipline
was noteworthy in that the arbitrator did not grant the Commissioner the
degree of deference that a court would likely have afforded him.
Finally, the case of former MLB pitcher John Rocker provides an
interesting example of where an arbitrator upheld a commissioner’s
disciplining of an athlete for off-the-court or off-the-field, non-criminal
behavior, while reducing the severity of the sanction.68 Following a series
of escalating, antagonistic interactions with baseball fans in New York City,
Rocker made “certain profoundly insensitive and arguably racist
statements” to a Sports Illustrated reporter.69
In response, MLB
Commissioner Bud Selig suspended Rocker from spring training for the
2000 MLB season; suspended him, with pay, from the opening day of the
2000 MLB season through May 1, 2000; required him to donate $20,000 to
either the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People
(NAACP) or another organization that promoted diversity efforts; and
required him to participate in a diversity training program before being
allowed to play again.70 Rocker, through the MLB Players Association,
filed a grievance with the MLB arbitrator, challenging the imposed
sanction.71
The arbitrator affirmed the Commissioner’s authority to discipline
players for off-the-field, speech-related, and non-criminal behavior.72
However, the arbitrator noted that while the Commissioner has a
“‘reasonable range of discretion’” related to imposing such discipline, the
penalty must be “‘reasonably commensurate with the offense’” and
“‘appropriate, given all circumstances.’”73 Based on this standard of
65

Id. at 576 (reducing his suspension from eighty-two games to sixty-eight games).
Id. at 574.
67
Id. at 573.
68
Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Comm’r of Major League Baseball (John
Rocker Arbitration Decision), in UNDERSTANDING BUSINESS AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE
SPORTS INDUSTRY 2001, at 765 (PLI Intellectual Prop., Course Handbook Series No. G-638,
2001).
69
Id. at 769 (quoting Bud Selig, MLB Comm’r).
70
Id. at 770.
71
Id. at 769.
72
Id. at 802-03.
73
Id. at 804 (citing Nixon (Panel Decision 84, Nicolau, 1992)).
66
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review, the arbitrator found the Commissioner’s disciplinary measures to be
excessive.74 The arbitrator noted, in particular, that the seventy-three-game
suspension was met or exceeded previously only in a handful of cases
involving serious drug offenses by repeat offenders.75 The arbitrator also
stated that the Commissioner provided no persuasive rationale as to why
Rocker’s offense warranted such a severe penalty.76 Accordingly, the
arbitrator reduced Rocker’s suspension to fourteen days (from opening day
until April 17, 2000) and his fine to $500.77 The arbitrator did, however,
sustain the diversity training program requirement.78
These decisions demonstrate that some arbitrators are less deferential
toward commissioners than courts have been. At the same time, even these
less friendly decisions reinforce the significant power of the respective
commissioner to discipline players, even if they reduce the severity of the
punishment. Moreover, other arbitrators have mirrored the type of
deference that courts have given commissioners’ actions with regard to
discipline and punishment of players. This, coupled with the deferential
treatment by the judiciary, helps solidify significant power and authority in
professional sports league commissioners, as their broad powers detailed
above are largely upheld by any reviewing entity.
III. THE BOTTOM LINE AND BELOW: MONEY AND FANS
Armed with plenary power, professional sports league commissioners
have begun increasingly to flex their best interest muscles to discipline
players who commit criminal acts off the court or field. There are many
compelling reasons why these commissioners are paying more attention to
athletes’ off-court and off-field behavior and responding accordingly. Of
primary importance may be the fact that when a league’s player commits
criminal acts off the court or field, the league’s image and profitability can
be significantly harmed.79 When players misbehave, fans may buy fewer
tickets and less merchandise, and advertising revenue may decrease, as
sponsors may not want to be affiliated with such criminal activity.80
Indeed, “[i]f and when fans replace admiration with disgust as a result of
the actions of certain players, the star quality of athletes ceases to be a
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Id. at 805-06.
Id. at 805.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 806.
78
Id.
79
Note, Out of Bounds: Professional Sports Leagues and Domestic Violence, 109 HARV.
L. REV. 1048, 1051 (1996) [hereinafter “Out of Bounds”].
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See Bukowski, supra note 22, at 107-08.
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useful commodity for the league.”81 This potential problem may be
exacerbated by the increased media attention that athletes’ criminal
activities receive.82 In light of this situation, it is understandable that
commissioners will impose more frequent and severe punishment to
publicize their respective league’s disapproval of such behavior, and
thereby minimize bad publicity and attendant financial damage.
While a league’s best interest could be limited to its bottom line,
according to the leagues themselves, private punishment of athletes also
seems to be motivated by broader social concerns.83 Interestingly, these
concerns appear to track those that traditionally justify public criminal
punishment—namely, retribution, deterrence, rehabilitation, and individual
virtue. In particular, a league’s punitive response to fan outrage over an
athlete’s criminal acts is likely to constitute a response to retribution- or
deterrence-oriented demands. Even if an athlete is punished by the public
criminal justice system, fans may demand action by leagues because of the
perception that athletes are favorably treated by the criminal justice
system—by police, judges, and juries84—or that public punishment will fail
to have the intended retributive or deterrent effect.85 In imposing
punishment, leagues not only refer to sources of power such as their best
interest authority, but also engage in general moral denunciation of athlete
misconduct.86
Leagues also embrace rehabilitative goals of punishment to help their
players learn to separate on-court aggression from off-the-court or off-thefield situations and relationships. In order to reach the elite level of play in
the professional leagues, most athletes must adopt a certain level of
aggression, intimidation, and even violence.87
Unfortunately, this
aggression and violence sometimes seeps into their personal lives, in the
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Id. at 108.
See Robinson, supra note 4, at 1323-25.
83
See Jim Rose et al., Regulating Coaches’ and Athletes’ Behavior off the Field, 4
DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 142 (2007) (discussing whether off-court and
off-field misconduct causes fans to become more cynical about the sport).
84
See Michael M. O’Hear, Blue-Collar Crimes/White-Collar Criminals: Sentencing Elite
Athletes Who Commit Violent Crimes, 12 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 427, 432 (2001).
85
League punishment in the form of fines and suspensions may have significant financial
effect on the player, achieving retributive goals more effectively than traditional public
punishment. In addition, league punishment may come swifter and more certain than public
punishment—qualities that enhance punishment’s deterrent effect. See Deana A. Pollard,
Sex Torts, 91 MINN. L. REV. 769, 813 (2007). Such private punishment may have both
specific and general deterrent effects. See Bukowski, supra note 22, at 108.
86
See infra notes 137-44 and accompanying text.
87
See Ellen E. Dabbs, Intentional Fouls: Athletes and Violence Against Women, 31
COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 167, 170 (1998).
82
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form of crimes such as domestic violence and sexual assault.88
Understandably, leagues do not want to become “breeding ground[s] for
domestic violence and sexual assault scandals.”89 Thus, leagues punish
their players in an effort to send a strong message that such behavior is
unacceptable and that athletes must channel their feelings of dominance into
their sport, not their personal lives.90 Leagues may also want their players
to get better, heal, and learn from their mistakes.91 Accordingly,
commissioners will also hand down punishment that includes counseling to
help the players address the issues that led them to commit such criminal
acts.92
Finally, leagues are also concerned with the individual character of
their athletes. For better or worse, players are role models for millions of
kids.93 The public criminal justice system sometimes takes this fact into
account in imposing punishment against criminal athletes.94 Sports leagues
also recognize the public status that athletes enjoy, and attempt to maintain
a good image through regulatory measures such as background checks and
dress codes.95 When commissioners punish players for criminal activity off
the court or field, it reinforces the requirement of good character that is
projected to the public.
In sum, sports leagues impose private punishment by appealing to
purposes that are more easily recognized as public in nature. They appear
to do this even though they clearly have ample powers to punish through
the private authorities discussed above in Part II.A. This suggests that
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See Moser, supra note 21, at 70.
See id.; see also O’Hear, supra note 84, at 430-31; Robinson, supra note 4, at 1321.
90
See Out of Bounds, supra note 79, at 1052 (“Particularly in sports such as football and
hockey, ‘[w]here assaults that would be illegal off the field become an accepted, even
celebrated’ part of the game, it is imperative that the league send a message that such
conduct is inappropriate outside the confines of the game.”).
91
See Bukowski, supra note 22, at 111, 117.
92
See, e.g., NAT’L BASKETBALL PLAYERS ASS’N, NBPA COLLECTIVE BARGAINING
AGREEMENT art. VI, § 5 (2005), available at http://www.nbpa.com/cba_articles.php
(requiring players who commit off-court violent acts to undergo a clinical evaluation and, if
warranted, counseling to address such behavior); see also Bukowski, supra note 22, at 117
(describing a similar counseling program in the NHL).
93
See Holly M. Burch & Jennifer B. Murray, An Essay on Athletes as Role Models,
Their Involvement in Charities, and Considerations in Starting a Private Foundation, 6
SPORTS LAW. J. 249, 250-51 (1999).
94
See infra note 138.
95
See Scott Burnside, Dress Code Suits NHLers Just Fine, ESPN.COM, Oct. 20, 2005,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nhl/columns/story?id=2198862 (referring to the NHL dress code
included in the collective bargaining agreement); Nat’l Basketball Ass’n, NBA Player Dress
Code, Oct. 20, 2005, http://www.nba.com/news/player_dress_code_051017.html; infra note
136.
89
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leagues believe such public purposes are necessary to justify their punitive
decisions, despite the existence of contractual authority to accomplish the
same.96 In doing so, sports leagues seemingly punish under the conceit that
punishment serves broader social aims rather than mere monetary interest.
On the one hand, we should applaud a private entity that takes such aims
into account in its decision making. On the other hand, it is unclear
whether and how such public purposes should be used in the private context
to engage in an act as fraught as punishment. To begin addressing this
question, we explore below the relationship between private and public
punishment, and consider whether league punishment may be
conceptualized as either one or the other. Although, as a general matter,
private entities like sports leagues are free to rationalize their decisions and
actions in whatever way they choose, we suggest that public purposes fall
short of full justification (that is, to the extent they are even necessary) due
to both legal and cultural limitations that exist in most private contexts.
IV. THE RISE OF PRIVATE PUNISHMENT
We begin by emphasizing that punishment of a criminal athlete by a
sports league is punishment, although imposed privately rather than by the
state through its laws. Although in much of criminal law scholarship the
term punishment primarily refers to that imposed by the state, it is in fact a
much broader concept. As Kent Greenawalt defines it, “punishment”
occurs whenever “persons who possess authority impose designedly
unpleasant consequences upon, and express their condemnation of, other
persons who are capable of choice and who have breached established
standards of behavior.”97
Increasingly, this broader understanding of punishment has entered
criminal law scholarship over the past several decades, encompassing topics
as diverse as regulation through social norms, restorative justice, and
private policing.98 This scholarship tends to divide into one of two models
96

It is important to distinguish between public purposes that purportedly justify the
contractual provisions of punishment—which remains a completely private matter between a
league and its athletes—and public purposes that directly justify the imposition of
punishment itself.
97
See Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 48, 48 (Leo
Katz et al. eds., 1999).
98
See generally Dan M. Kahan, Privatizing Criminal Law: Strategies for Private Norm
Enforcement in the Inner City, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1859 (1999) (discussing social norms); Ric
Simmons, Private Criminal Justice, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 911 (2007) (addressing
private policing and restorative justice); David A. Sklansky, The Private Police, 46 UCLA L.
REV. 1165 (1999) (detailing private policing). Private punishment that does not enjoy an
appreciable level of normative desirability or legitimacy, like vigilantism, is not part of our
discussion here. Cf. Elizabeth E. Joh, Conceptualizing the Private Police, 2005 UTAH L.
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of privatization: (1) cooperative or (2) exclusive. The cooperative model
posits that the continued vitality of public criminal law depends on the
active participation of private individuals or groups that have a stake in the
law’s effectiveness.99 This is particularly true in those areas of the country,
like the inner cities of Boston and Chicago, where tension and distrust
between the police and the community run so high that the state has lost its
moral legitimacy.100 Boston’s Ten Point Coalition and Chicago’s prayer
vigils, wherein Black churches utilize their moral authority to legitimate
state-sponsored, anti-crime programs, are examples of cooperative
approaches that seek to counteract the effect of state delegitimization and
secure citizen cooperation.101 Although it can be said that the law often
encourages and relies on private entities—to report crime, identify
criminals, testify in court, and even participate to varying degrees in the
capture of perpetrators102—the new privatization thesis takes a much
stronger position in critiquing public criminal justice. Its advocates assert
that private cooperation is “essential” to the future viability of public
criminal law to control crime precisely because of the public, or statecentered, nature of that law.103
The other dominant model of privatization focuses not on cooperation,
but exclusion. While the cooperative model offers a framework for private
entities to opt in to the public criminal justice system where the incentives
and pressures to opt out are powerful,104 the exclusive model represents an
opt-out in favor of private resolution that better suits the parties involved in
the crime. Restorative justice and private policing are two well-known
examples of the exclusive model.105 Restorative justice, in its strongest

REV. 573, 583 (excluding vigilantism from the definition of “private policing” because of its
“lack of a close connection to formal law”).
99
See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 98, at 1862 (arguing that private groups like the Black
church or juvenile groups may be more effective in controlling crime in the inner city than
the state).
100
See id. at 1861.
101
See id. at 1863-66.
102
The Supreme Court has been careful to allow the police room to obtain citizen
cooperation. See Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 425 (2004) (acknowledging that citizen
cooperation is “vital” to effective policing); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 488
(1971) (“But it is no part of the policy underlying the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments to
discourage citizens from aiding to the utmost of their ability in the apprehension of
criminals.”); see also supra Part IV (discussing private policing).
103
Kahan, supra note 98, at 1860.
104
Thus, Kahan’s thesis is most applicable to crime-ridden, inner-city communities,
where he observes that the moral authority of the state has been “enfeebled.” Id. at 1861.
105
See Simmons, supra note 98, at 911 (proposing that restorative justice and private
policing are “forging an alternative private criminal justice system”). As we describe below,
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form, contemplates a community-based response to crime that precludes
public punishment (and process) in the conventional sense of that term.106
The modern movement is based on the premise that public criminal law
both neglects the needs of the victim and excessively punishes the
offender.107
Instead, the community should directly address the
reintegration of both the victim and offender so as to heal the rift that has
been created by crime.108
Private policing is also a means of accessing direct resolution of crime
that bypasses the public criminal justice system. Recent scholarship on
private policing has revealed that the phenomenon of private policing has
grown rapidly and may now be seen as overtaking public policing in some
measures.109 Private security guards hired by corporations and other private
organizations are the most common examples of private policing at work
today.110 When private security—for example, a guard at a department
store—detects a crime (such as theft of merchandise), the victim—in this
case the department store—has the choice to call the police and instigate
public prosecution, or to handle the matter itself by seeking a private
remedy, such as repayment for lost property111 or ejection from the store.112
For private entities that seek to avoid the publicity and other costs of

discipline in the employment context may also be classified as an instance of private
punishment. See infra notes 122-129 and accompanying text.
106
See Leena Kurki, Restorative and Community Justice in the United States, 27 CRIME
& JUST. 235, 264 (2000) (observing that some proponents of restorative justice view it as “an
ideal of individualized and informal justice in which people handle their conflicts without
state interference”); cf. Kenworthey Bilz, The Puzzle of Delegated Revenge, 87 B.U. L. REV.
1059, 1061 (2007) (positing that our willingness to delegate revenge to a third-party—often,
the state—must be explained). Such strong forms of restorative justice are traced back to
practices of indigenous tribes and ancient civilizations. See id. at 1095-96. The weaker
forms that are currently found in the United States usually involve rehabilitative or
diversionary programs relating to mostly minor offenses and juveniles only. See Zvi D.
Gabbay, Holding Restorative Justice Accountable, 8 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 85, 10110 (2006) (describing programs in Wisconsin, Iowa, Virginia, and New York).
107
See Simmons, supra note 98, at 913-16.
108
See Kurki, supra note 106, at 263.
109
See Joh, supra note 98, at 575 (noting that private police are sometimes considered
“the first line of defense in the war against terrorism”); Simmons, supra note 98, at 920-21
(observing that spending on private security doubles that on public police); David Alan
Sklansky, Private Police and Democracy, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 89, 89 (2006) (“Today
private guards greatly outnumber sworn law enforcement officers throughout the United
States, and the gap continues to widen.”). As Sklansky and Joh point out, private policing
takes varied forms. See Joh, supra note 98, at 610 tbl.1; Sklansky, supra, at 92-94.
110
Cf. Sklansky, supra note 98, at 1168 (describing the explosive growth of the private
security industry).
111
See Simmons, supra note 98, at 939-40 (discussing restitution-demand letters).
112
See Joh, supra note 98, at 589 (discussing a case of banishment from Macy’s).
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pursuing public prosecution, such remedies offer an attractive solution to
the problem of crime.113
Although grouped together as models and examples of privatization,
each of the approaches described above differs from the other in significant
ways. Two points of distinction are particularly noteworthy: the level of
privatization that the examples display and, relatedly, the purposes that they
pursue.
Of the three, the cooperative programs in Boston and Chicago are
obviously the least private. Although they emphasize and depend on
private participation, the goal of each program is ultimately to bolster the
effectiveness of the public criminal justice system by highlighting the
common ground that exists between the community and the state—that is,
the desire to reduce violence and crime. That common ground, however, is
decidedly publicly oriented in the sense that both the state and the private
entities that cooperate with the state seek to place offenders within the
public criminal justice system, which pursues the broad societal goals of
criminal law such as retribution. Thus, cooperative programs seemingly
espouse the governance model of organization—concerned with “values
such as integrity, the accommodation of interests, and morality”—as does
the public police.114
The restorative justice movement has more “private” features than the
cooperative programs of Boston and Chicago, but it also embraces public
characteristics as well. On the one hand, its rejection of state-imposed
retributive punishment in favor of private resolutions that meet the specific
needs of the victim and the offender suggests that achieving restorative
justice is a highly private affair.115 Most notably, unlike in the traditional
public system, the victim has a more significant role in the restorative
At the same time, the role of the public—here, the
process.116
community—is also emphasized in the course of promoting reintegration of

113

See id. at 590.
See id. at 591 (referring to Philip Selznick’s distinctions).
115
See, e.g., A Healing Circle in the Innu Community of Sheshashit, JUSTICE AS HEALING:
A NEWSLETTER ON ABORIGINAL CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE (Native Law Centre, Saskatoon,
Saskatchewan, Can.), Summer 1997, available at www.usask.ca/nativelaw/publications/
jah/1997/Heal_Circle_Innu.pdf (describing how the circle consisted of ten members,
including the victim, the offender, five family members, two facilitators, and one court
liaison).
116
See, e.g., id. (describing how a “circle of concern and support” organized by the Innu
Community in Canada took pains to provide a rape victim with “an opportunity to say what
needed to happen for her to feel that the situation was being made more right,” as well as to
allow the offender “an opportunity to acknowledge responsibility for his actions”); see also
Kurki, supra note 106, at 266 (rejecting the suggestion that restorative justice is a part of the
victims’ rights movement, which has been used mainly to increase punishment of offenders).
114
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both the victim and the offender. Moreover, the movement emphasizes
values such as restitution, reintegration, and community-building as more
appropriate purposes of the criminal justice system.117 Accordingly, one
could fairly characterize restorative justice as also engaged in the purposes
and values of a governance model.
Private policing is the most private of the three examples of
privatization. Private policing addresses the needs of a “client,” not a
publicly minded, community group. Its processes and goals may be entirely
private, tailored specifically for the customer that the security force is paid
to serve.118 Thus, the legal context for private policing involves not only
criminal law, but, more prominently, property law.119 Both the process—
excluding the participation of public police and prosecutors—and the
goals—vindicating private property rights—render private policing quite
distinct from the other privatization examples described above.120 In this
way, private policing follows a managerial form of organization that
emphasizes “efficiency and goal-achievement” over the pursuit of more
universal values.121
A league’s punishment of its athletes is an instance of employmentrelated punishment, which resembles private policing.122
Like the
department store that opts for repayment by, or ejection of, shoplifters,
employment-related punishment may substitute private restitution for public
prosecution.
Especially when the crime is work-related, such as
embezzlement, many employers tend to forgo criminal prosecution.123
Indeed, one scholar has observed that embezzlement has become a “merely
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See Kurki, supra note 106, at 265-66.
See Joh, supra note 98, at 587 (“Perhaps the most central feature of private
policing . . . is its client-driven mandate. . . . [W]hat counts as deviant or disorderly behavior
for private police is defined not in moral terms but instrumentally, by a client’s particular
aims: a pleasant shopping experience, a safe parking area, or an orderly corporate campus.”).
119
See id. (observing that private policing is conceptualized in terms of “loss” rather than
“crime”).
120
Id.; see infra Part V.
121
See Joh, supra note 98, at 591.
122
Although there is little written specifically about employment-related punishment as a
form of private criminal punishment, the idea is often implied. See Greenawalt, supra note
97, at 48; Joh, supra note 98, at 589-90 & n.109.
123
See Joh, supra note 98, at 588. The preference for restitution over public prosecution
may be driven by the employer’s attempt to avoid bad publicity, which is particularly
important to large or well-established financial institutions that highly value their
reputations. Or it may reflect reluctance on the part of the employer to lose the employee’s
services. See id. at 590.
118
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private transaction” in light of the widespread preference for restitution.124
Such private resolution may seem unremarkable; after all, misbehavior on
the job—where the victim is the employer or other employees—surely
implicates primarily the employer-employee relationship, which is usually a
private one governed by contract. Interestingly, even if the criminal
conduct occurs outside of work, suspending or firing a criminal employee is
considered to be an ordinary function of workplace management.125 Such
misbehavior may be considered, for example, to diminish the employee’s
ability to carry out her duties or to affect adversely the reputation of the
employer—reasons for discipline that are ostensibly found in the
employment contract.126 In this setting, punishment is grounded in both
property and contract principles, and may be highly private and managerial
in approach. It should be noted, however, that when an employee commits
a crime outside of work, the employer may lose its ability to exclude
completely the public criminal law. After all, most employers are unlikely
to exercise enough influence on unrelated victims to avoid the public
prosecution of its employees. In this sense, any private punishment
imposed by employers for the off-duty crimes of employees may serve to
supplement, but not supplant, public punishment of the offender.127
Punishment by sports leagues may similarly be viewed as largely
private and managerial, grounded mainly in contract and property law.128
Certainly, punishment is being imposed by an authoritative private entity
rather than the state. The league can easily justify its decision under
contract law (pointing to the terms of players’ contracts, the league
constitution, by-laws, and collective bargaining agreements) as well as
property law (arguing loss of good reputation and will, and decreasing
ticket or merchandise sales) for misbehavior on and off the court or field.129
And like other instances of employer-employee punishment, sports leagues
possess an imperfect ability to exclude public criminal law when the
criminal act occurs off the court or field.
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See JEROME HALL, THEFT, LAW, AND SOCIETY 311 (1952); see also Douglas H. Frazer,
To Catch a Thief: Civil Strategies for Handling Embezzlement Cases, 75 WIS. LAW. 6 (2002)
(describing the motivation to avoid public criminal law in embezzlement cases).
125
See Roger I. Abrams & Dennis R. Nolan, Toward a Theory of “Just Cause” in
Employee Discipline Cases, 1985 DUKE L.J. 594, 616-17.
126
Id.
127
This is not to suggest that private punishment is “lighter” than its public counterpart.
See Joh, supra note 98, at 589-90.
128
Courts appear to view league punishment this way, generally applying minimal
review of league decisions under the loose requirements of private association law. See Jan
Stiglitz, Player Discipline in Team Sports, 5 MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 167, 174 (1994).
129
See supra Parts II.A & III.
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But there are certain features of league punishment, absent in other
employment and private policing contexts, which tilt such decisions toward
a public, rather than private, understanding of the phenomenon. These
include: (1) the public nature of punishment, (2) the sense of direct
accountability to fans, and (3) the assertion of independent moral authority
to punish by sports leagues or commissioners. These features should give
pause to anyone who would reflexively treat league punishment as a purely
private and managerial matter. In the remainder of this Essay, we consider
each of these features in greater detail and discuss their theoretical
ramifications.
V. LEAGUE PUNISHMENT: MORE PUBLIC THAN PRIVATE?
At the outset, it is worth reiterating that employer-imposed punishment
for criminal conduct outside of work cannot be characterized as largely
cooperative or exclusive. Instead, such instances of private punishment
often stand independently of public law (as opposed to reacting to it); that is
to say, there is no reason to think that public conviction and punishment
affects either the decision to punish or the kind and amount of private
punishment meted out.130 This is because employers typically exercise
authority under property or contract law, thereby operating outside the
principles that guide punishment under criminal law.
On the other hand, the private law versus public law distinction should
not be overdrawn. An accurate understanding of any form of punishment
requires sensitivity to its nature and context in each case. For example, we
have observed that league punishment is different from typical instances of
employer-imposed punishment because punishment by a sports league
tends to be public. By this we mean that a league’s decision to punish is
highly publicized. This is a far cry from the discretion that many employers
seek to exercise through avenues like restitution and termination when
employees commit crimes.131 And even when the employer is unconcerned
about privacy and makes no effort to preserve it, typical employer-imposed
punishment does not usually enter the wider public’s consciousness. In
130
In fact, the first significant punitive action taken by a sports league was marked by
independence from decisions of the public criminal law. Judge Kenesaw Mountain Landis,
the first commissioner of baseball, banished the eight players involved in the 1919 “Black
Sox” scandal even after their acquittal by a jury. See Sigman, supra note 13, at 305-06. In
so doing, Landis declared independent authority to punish.
There appears to be, however, at least one instance where the public prosecution was
affected by league punishment. Marcus Moore, a player for the Colorado Rockies, was
acquitted of rape and sexual assault, apparently because at least one juror believed that
“being traded down to the minors was punishment enough.” Chamberlain et al., supra note
4, at 556.
131
See supra notes 107-110 and accompanying text.
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contrast, league punishment has public, social effects that render it less like
other forms of private punishment and more comparable to state-imposed
punishment; through coverage by the media and, indeed, the public
statements of the league itself, league punishment sparks public discourse
about its occurrence and appropriateness.132
Why is league punishment so public in nature? Obviously, part of the
reason is that professional sports generally attract media attention and the
criminal conduct of athletes is, for better or worse, of intense interest to the
public.133 Thus, publicity is almost unavoidable. But this does not explain
why a league engages in very public acts of punishment rather than treating
punishment as a private, employment-related matter. This approach
appears to stem from the notion that the league is accountable to the public
for the misbehavior of its athletes. Moreover, this notion seems to be
shared by the league and the public alike.134 The belief in public
accountability is a second feature of league punishment that resembles
public, rather than private, punishment regimes. Sports leagues tend to be
responsive to the beliefs and demands of the fans much as public criminal
law is responsive to the beliefs and demands of the political constituency
(again, for better or worse).135 The commissioner, like a politician or a
public prosecutor, typically holds press conferences and makes official
statements aimed at reassuring the public that athlete misconduct is being

132

This holds true even if we compare league punishment to restorative justice. As
discussed supra, restorative justice has a public aspect to it–community involvement–but it
is public on a much smaller scale. It is theoretically critical of the large-scale, professional
approach to crime, choosing instead to resolve disputes in an intimate setting with
punishment tailored to the offender’s and the victim’s needs. In contrast, league punishment
reaches a broad public; and while there is some emphasis on individual rehabilitation,
punishment typically takes the standard forms of fines, suspensions, and terminations. See
supra note 29.
133
See Ambrose, supra note 24, at 1071; Robinson, supra note 4, at 1313.
134
See, e.g., Ambrose, supra note 24, at 1074 (stating that criminal misconduct by
players is “‘detrimental to the integrity of and public confidence in the National Football
League’” (quoting NFL PLAYERS ASS’N, supra note 25)); cf. Ugolini, supra note 3, at 42
(observing that the NFL “will ultimately be held responsible, whether in the court of law or
in the court of public opinion” when players misbehave).
Some scholarship in this field suggests that league punishment is appropriate because the
public criminal law insufficiently punishes professional athletes for their crimes. See, e.g.,
Moser, supra note 21, at 71 (noting that domestic violence cases involving athletes have a
36% conviction rate, while the rate for the general public is at 75%); cf. Chamberlain et al.,
supra note 4, at 552 (observing that there is widespread belief that celebrity criminals are
more likely to be acquitted or receive a lighter sentence than non-celebrities).
135
See Simmons, supra note 98, at 975 (blaming populist politics for increasing
criminalization and harsher punishments); William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of
Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 510 (2001) (explaining that expansion of criminal
law has much to do with politics and public opinion).
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taken seriously—both before and after such misconduct occurs136—and that
the offender will suffer appropriate consequences.
As we described above, the contractual sources of league punishment
often refer to notions such as “integrity,” “public confidence,” “standards of
morality,” and “fair play.”137 Athletes are also referred to as “role-models,”
a status that demands moral rectitude and upstanding behavior.138 Such
rhetoric suggest that something more than simple financial well-being is
implicated in the league’s policies; accountability to the public includes not
only bare preservation of the league for the sake of entertaining fans, but
also the projection of a positive moral image of the sport and its
participants.139 Indeed, allowing an allegedly criminal athlete to continue to
collect multimillion-dollar paychecks without interruption would fly in the
face of commonsense justice and morality (private and public), not to
mention constitute a very poor life lesson for watchful children.
Moreover, a league’s moral rhetoric often extends beyond the reasons
that underlie contractual language. For example, when NFL Commissioner
Roger Goodell imposed an indefinite suspension on Michael Vick for
dogfighting and gambling, the letter he issued did not limit itself to the
various agreements or employment conditions that surely would have
sufficed to justify his decision. Commissioner Goodell went further, calling
Vick’s actions “illegal, . . . cruel and reprehensible,” and his association
with betting as exposing him to “corrupting influences.”140 In his letter to
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See, e.g., Darin Gantt, Teams Wary of Troublemakers in Draft, THE HERALD (S.C.),
Apr. 22, 2007, at 1D (reporting new emphasis on background searches for the NFL draft).
137
See supra Part II.A.
138
See Chamberlain et al., supra note 4, at 557 (referring to a 1983 case involving three
Kansas City Royal baseball players who received a higher-than-normal sentence for
attempted cocaine possession); Robinson, supra note 4, at 1328 (arguing that professional
athletes are sometimes held to higher standards and expected to “conform to the public’s
image of ‘flawless human beings’”).
139
See Goodell Suspends Pacman, Henry for Multiple Arrests, ESPN.COM, May 17,
2007, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2832015 (quoting Roger Goodell, NFL
Comm’r) (“‘We must protect the integrity of the NFL . . . . The highest standards of conduct
must be met by everyone in the NFL because it is a privilege to represent the NFL, not a
right. These players, and all members of our league, have to make the right choices and
decisions in their conduct on a consistent basis.’”); see also Robert L. Bard & Lewis
Kurlantzick, Knicks-Heat and the Appropriateness of Sanctions in Sport, 20 CARDOZO ARTS
& ENT. L.J. 507, 512-14 (2002) (describing three sets of rules in the NBA: (1) “rectificatory
rules,” such as awarding free throws for fouls; (2) rules empowering referees to control the
game, such as awarding free throws for technical fouls; and (3) rules designed to preserve
the aesthetics or reputation of the game, such as behavior or appearance rules).
140
See Vick Suspended Indefinitely by NFL, ESPN.COM, Aug. 24, 2007,
http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=2990157. Commissioner Goodell went on to
write: “I hope that you will be able to learn from this difficult experience and emerge from it
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Adam “Pacman” Jones regarding suspension, Commissioner Goodell
referred to a “disturbing pattern of behavior.”141 In 2007, along with the
fifteen-game suspension that he handed down to Mark Bell of the Toronto
Maple Leafs for drunk driving and hit-and-run charges, NHL
Commissioner Gary Bettman stated, “‘Playing in the National Hockey
League is a privilege, and with that privilege comes a corresponding
responsibility for exemplary conduct off the ice as well as on it . . . .’”142 In
2001, when Ruben Patterson was suspended by NBA Commissioner David
Stern for five games after pleading guilty to attempted rape, Seattle Sonics
team president Wally Walker commented, “The league is sending a
message. Much like the NFL, the NBA is holding its players accountable
for their off-court actions.”143 The moral underpinnings of these punitive
decisions suggest that sports leagues embrace a governance form of
organization—which pursues broad social values over narrow, private
goals—further
reinforcing
its
public
rather
than
private
conceptualization.144
If we are correct, and league punishment can be understood, at least in
significant part, as enforcing public values, the system raises some serious
concerns. The first has to do with process. Although the public is no doubt
concerned about the preservation of its moral values, our society also
recognizes the importance of ideals such as equality, fairness, and
consistency, especially in the context of punishment. Many commentators
have noted the absence of any rigorous mechanism to apply these ideals in

better prepared to act responsibly and to make the kinds of choices that are expected of a
conscientious and law abiding citizen.” Id.
141
Pacman Suspended at Least 4 Games for Violating Conduct Policy, ESPN.COM, Oct.
15, 2008, http://sports.espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3643240. Jerry Jones, the owner of
the Dallas Cowboys, expressed the hope that Adam “Pacman” Jones “intensify his approach
to getting better with his social conduct.” Id. Because the suspension was not based on any
criminal conviction, but a pattern of misbehavior, some have argued that it was based on the
“morals clause” in his contract rather than on any specific violation of the NFL’s conduct
policy. See Rose et al., supra note 83, at 142.
142
See Maple Leafs’ Bell Suspended 15 Games, CBC SPORTS, Sept. 12, 2007,
http://www.cbc.ca/sports/hockey/story/2007/09/12/bell-suspension.html.
143
See Ronald Tillery, Patterson Sentenced to Jail, SEATTLE POST-INTELLIGENCER, May
16, 2001, at D1.
144
Sports leagues even punish for non-criminal, but otherwise immoral, conduct by their
players. In 2000, Atlanta Braves pitcher John Rocker was suspended for bigoted statements
that he made about minorities in New York City. See Rocker On: Braves Closer Gets
Suspension and Fine Reduced, CNNSI.COM, Mar. 2, 2000, http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/
baseball/mlb/news/2000/03/01/rocker_suspension_ap/. In 2008, hockey player Sean Avery
was suspended and then cut from his team, the Dallas Stars, after referring to an ex-girlfriend
as “sloppy seconds.” Sean Avery Cut from Dallas Stars, USMAGAZINE.COM, Dec. 15, 2008,
http://www.usmagazine.com/news/sean-avery-cut-from-dallas-stars.
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the league punishment context.145 The decision to punish, and how much to
punish, appears to lie entirely in the hands of the individual commissioner
with little oversight as to the integrity of that decision.146 Without formal
procedural protections or punishment guidelines, it is inevitable that league
punishment will lack uniformity among commissioners and among leagues.
Perhaps even more fundamentally problematic are the ways in which
wayward athletes are identified for punishment. Sports leagues have no
independent means of detecting the criminal misconduct of their athletes;
they seem to rely on the ever-present media to alert them to such incidents.
Media reports of misconduct sometimes lead to public outcry, which one
commentator has argued “could well be the most effective tool” in reducing
the incidence of athletes’ criminal misconduct.147 Public outcry for
punishment no doubt generates more prompt, and probably more severe,
response by sports leagues. This kind of accountability to the public
exacerbates the problems that are created by a punitive system that lacks
procedural protections for offenders.
Moreover, reliance on public outcry tends to reinscribe the cultural
limitations that are inherent in any system that reflects popular values. One
cannot help but notice how much more outrage there was over Vick’s
dogfighting incident than over the countless domestic abuse incidents that
have plagued professional sports.148 And while wife-beating is often
145

See Paul Finkelman, Baseball and the Rule of Law Revisited, 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV.
17, 28-29 (2002); Bukowski, supra note 22, at 112-16; Lockwood, supra note 10, at 166; see
also Sklansky, supra note 98, at 1230-33 (explaining that courts have generally held the
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments to be inapplicable to private police).
146
See Gwen Knapp, NFL Did What It Had to Do with New Conduct Policy, S.F.
CHRON., Apr. 12, 2007, at D1 (observing that the NFL’s conduct policy “licenses [the
commissioner] to be equal parts Wyatt Earp and [Justice] Potter (‘I know it when I see it’)
Stewart”); see also supra Part II.B (describing the generally high degree of deference by
courts and arbitrators to commissioners’ punitive decisions).
147
See Moser, supra note 21, at 86 (discussing public outcry in the context of deterring
domestic abuse).
148
See Tracy Clark-Flory, Wife Abuse v. Dog Abuse, SALON.COM, Aug. 17, 2007,
http://www.salon.com/mwt/broadsheet/2007/08/17/vick; Sandra Kobrin, Beat a Woman?
Play On; Beat a Dog?
You’re Gone, WOMEN’S ENEWS, Aug. 21, 2007,
http://www.womensenews.org/article.cfm?aid=3285.
Carrie Moser has argued that the public does express disapproval of domestic abuse,
referring to fan reaction against then New Jersey Nets player, Jason Kidd, during the 2003
playoff series against the Boston Celtics (Kidd committed the domestic violence as a
member of the Phoenix Suns in 2001). See Moser, supra note 21, at 74-75. In that case,
however, the critical fans appear to have been Celtics supporters, making it questionable
whether the reaction was genuine moral disapproval or merely fan partisanship. See also
Knapp, supra note 146 (reporting that despite public clamor, the NFL did not become
involved in the domestic abuse case against Colts cornerback Steve Muhammad until he was
convicted).
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ignored or treated lightly by sports leagues, Vick has been suspended
indefinitely (with the possibility of banishment) for dog-beating.149 Where
there is no systematic way to address the criminal misconduct of offenders,
and public outrage is the impetus for punishment, these types of
inconsistent and normatively problematic results are likely to continue to
occur.
VI. CONCLUSION
Punishment by professional sports leagues cannot be cleanly defined
as either purely private or public in nature. Nor can the incentives and
rationales for such discipline be understood solely through one or the other
lens. Rather, punishment in professional sports leagues represents a hybrid
form of criminal punishment that does not fit neatly into any existing
paradigm.
Such uncertainty raises serious concerns about the
appropriateness of league punishment, not just in terms of consistency and
proportionality, but also of its social function and justification.
In this Essay, we have sought to launch a discussion about league
punishment that situates it within criminal law scholarship’s recent interest
in private punishment as well as its long-standing struggle with theories of
public punishment. We believe that the tensions and potential pitfalls of
league punishment warrant further reflection by sports leagues to better
define and structure their approaches to punishment.

149
See Mike Bianchi, Ignoring Domestic Abuse Is the Shame of the Sports World,
ORLANDO SENTINEL, Aug. 5, 2007, at C1.
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